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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Professor Rose has provided us with a truly rich and provocative paper. Within the 
framework of this commentary it is not possible either to provide an adequate exposition 
of the paper's suggestive ideas or to examine all of the problematic relationships proposed 
by Peirce regarding the world-mind argument connections. Perhaps a good way of 
probing some of the aspects of these relationships is to hold in mind the juxtaposition of 
two phrases which occur in one of sentences in the paper (p. 8): “Mind is merely the 
structures or patterns found in nature raised to the level of conscious thought”; “logic is 
merely those same argumentative structures brought under deliberate, self-controlled 
thought.”  The structures that are in question in each of the phrases form the bases for the 
defence of the idea of “the universe as argument”—as the title of the paper claims.  
 
2. DIAGRAMMATIC SUMMARY 
 
Due to the complexity of the paper I would like to summarize rapidly some of the 
conceptual relationships presented as basic for the thesis. Professor Rose's logical layout 
of these makes a diagrammatic survey not only the quickest way to get an overview of his 
detailed exposition but also the easiest way to reference particular points. From Diagram 
I it becomes clear that Philosophy is a science that discovers what is true in reality, 
differing from the general truths of Mathematics that need not bear on the real and the 
specialized truths of other sciences. From Diagram II one can see that Logic is a 
Normative science but not in the sense of Ethics or Esthetics being normative. Logic 
furnishes norms for correct thinking (“self-controlled or deliberate thought”) taken as 
“thought in general” as opposed, say, to specific psychological aspects of our mental 
operations. Since Logic falls under Philosophy which is a positive science of discovery, it 
deals with the real; indeed, the “axiom that real things exist” is “the fundamental axiom 
of logic.” (p. 3) Since Logic deals with thoughts and thoughts are neither particulars (as 
facts are) nor independent of time and realization (as qualities are). Rather thoughts bring 
together and provide the reason for a fact (subject) and a quality (predicate) to be brought 
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together, i.e. “thought is a reasonable relation between a fact and a quality,” i.e. it is a 
mediation.  
For Peirce a Sign is a form of mediation. Diagram III shows how the sign 
mediates the object and the interpretant. One can also see that signs are of different sorts, 
but it is the sign as symbol that becomes important for our topic since arguments, which 
are ruled governed, fall under the symbolical. One can also see in this diagram that 
argumentation is a more specific type of argument. Arguments need not be instantiated 
“in any thinker here and now.” (p. 8) As Rose writes,  
 
[…] it is the normative character of Arguments that frees them from having to be instantiated in 
any thinker here and now, for this allows them to refer to some possible thinker not yet present in 
any actual or fully determinate sense.” (p. 8)  
 
Argumentation, on the other hand, seems to presuppose something “deliberate and self-
controlled” and, if I am not mistaking Professor Rose, realized by a given mind. Finally, 
it is important to note that Logic is seen as especially relating to the real insofar as it 
taken to be Methodeutic (or Speculative Rhetoric)—“Logic is a positive normative 
science whose ultimate aim is to advance thought towards truth.” (p. 6) 
 
3. UNIVERSE AS REAL OR AS ACCOUNT 
 
All of this helps to provide foundations for dealing with the bewilderment that many will 
have when they read Peirce's remark:   
 
the Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem,—for every fine 
argument is a poem and a symphony,—just as every true poem is a sound argument. (cited, p. 8).  
 
Rose expands on the sense of this and the circumambient text of Peirce by saying:   
 
Arguments in this general, logical sense are not peculiar to minds. Instead the mental embodiment 
or expression of an Argument or Argumentation is itself merely the broader argumentative 
structures and processes found throughout nature manifest or expressed in the mode of conscious 
thought or mind. (p. 8)   
 
I expect that Professor Rose intended to insert parentheses around the phrase “or 
Argumentation” so that in effect, “the mental embodiment or expression of an Argument” 
=  “Argumentation.” Thus, although we could make the proposal that the universe is an 
Argument we could not hold that the universe is an Argumentation.  
However, it seems to me that many will find Peirce’s remark about the Universe 
as an argument as really strange. Now, one can argue for some kind of isomorphism 
between thought and reality—indeed, this is something that Aristotle and the Aristotelian 
tradition already possessed. The first three books of the Organon were thought to indicate 
the strong relationships between the elements of the world, mind, and language. The 
Categories analysis rested on the existence of basic essences knowable by intuitions, the 
On Interpretation dealt with complexes knowable in judgments, and the Analytics 
considered the linkage of those complexes in inferences. Consider the following table 
(Diagram IV): 
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 Mental Operation Linguistic Items Reality 
Categories Intuition Term essence 
On Interpretation Judgment Statement (subj/pred) Substance-attribute
Analytics  Inference Syllogism Complexes  
 
That there is some kind of correspondence between the world and the mind, that aspects 
of logic mirror the structure of things in the world is not something that is completely 
novel or that should surprise philosophers. However, most of them would be surprised if 
Aristotle were to say: “The world is a syllogism.”  
 Now, Professor Rose can certainly find ammunition in Peirce’s arsenal to defend 
what might seem as a lonely outpost. As must be clear to many readers of Peirce, the very 
triadic structure that is so influential in his writing seems to be of Hegelian inspiration, as 
is the notion of mediation which is playing such a significant role at the very root of the 
notion of sign. Similarly, the teleological—dare I say—eschatological drive of his 
philosophy seems to parallel the move of logic toward the (completely?) rational. As 
Rose writes,  
 
Logic is a positive normative science whose ultimate aim is to advance thought towards the truth. 
As we shall see, this is equivalent to the aim at making the world more reasonable. (p. 6)   
 
But what is the sense of “world” here? An extra-mental reality? If so, the mind would be 
rendering something outside itself ordered. Such is a very powerful mind indeed. But 
perhaps, on the other hand, “world” is just the representation of mind of what is taken to 
be known. If so, then the world as argument would simply be what is known, a theory 
that has established itself.  
 The problem that Peirce faces is the same problem that Hegel should have 
confronted—but dodged. This problem, in my opinion, is two sided. On the one side it is 
the problem that I have already noted, the problem of the extra-mental reality of the 
universe. Hegel may seem to have made the problem disappear but ultimately seems to 
have hidden it under the warp and woof of his dialectic tapestry. On the other side it is the 
problem of the reality of mind. Outside of the phenomenological elaboration of the 
contents, activities and products of mind, the question arises whether there is any 
ontological foundation or reality of mind itself. If not, then one is left again with mere 
representation. Indeed, the all-enveloping commens that Professor Rose highlights simply 
seems to be more support for a reading of Peirce as one who simply neglects the 
ontological status of mind. The commens is a holistic framework which has a “dynamical 
object” that “does not mean something out of the mind.” (p. 10) The role of  consensus in 
belief, the joint individual and communal agreement which produces a true integrity of 
belief (p. 13) is again indicative of the essential role played by this shared mind.  
 What Professor Rose says about Peirce’s use of the distinction concerning 
Breadth, Depth, and Information is of importance precisely with respect to both the 
teleological and the representational side of knowledge. Growth in knowledge, which 
takes place not deductively but abductively and inductively, depends on gaining both 
breadth and depth together. If one were to use the Aristotelian syllogism as a model, one 
might say that growth depends on adding middle terms or minor terms to a given major. 
This openness in knowledge must be paralleled in reality:  “Peirce comes to realize that 
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what is true epistemically is also true of reality in general, that reality is an open rather 
than a closed system.” (p. 16) However, note that even here we are making a distinction 
between the known and the real. Thus, the criticism raised a little while ago can be raised 
again. Is the Universe an argument or does it just resemble an argument, i.e., does it just 
possess a possibility for development in a way that resembles the ever-developing 
accumulation of knowledge? While one does not want to overlook some fascinating 
points that Professor Rose makes with respect to argument, types of reasoning, growth of 
reasoning, and goal of reasoning, one still needs to confront the basic issue how what is 
known is related to the knower and the knowing process. The naturalist flavor of Peirce’s 
understanding of the growth of both logic and knowledge might seem to bridge this 
difference, but the question remains whether it is sufficient to do so. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Professor Rose has presented a penetrating and insightful examination of some pivotal 
ideas in Peirce. My criticism is not so much of his paper as it is of a problem that seems 
to be lurking within Peirce’s philosophy itself, the problem of relating the knowing 
process to reality itself. Of course, Peirce appears to seamlessly weave together such 
seemingly opposed approaches as those of idealism and naturalism that the resulting 
fabric has the appearance of a durable canvas upon which he can paint his theory. 
Naturalist tendencies are quite widespread in current English speaking and analytic 
philosophical circles; talk of the world as narrative is popular in European and post-
modern circle. More specifically, Peircean talk of truth as consensus and the agreement of 
scientific inquirers has found sympathy even in highly technical American philosophers, 
e.g., Wilfrid Sellars and his view of the coherence view of truth as found in the agreement 
of the scientific community. However, the fact that there is also a resurgent interest in the 
role of the a priori indicates that consensus on these philosophical issues is not yet in 
sight. 
 
          Link to paper 
